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CASE COMMENTS
PETITIONERS FOR FEDERAL WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NoBIs
MUST SHOW "LINGERING CIVIL DISABILITIES" FROM
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION
United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2013 (1991)
In United States v. Craig,1 the Seventh Circuit refined its restrictive
"lingering civil disabilities" 2 test to determine when petitioners seeking
post-conviction relief may obtain writs of error coram nobis.3 The court
held that an individual who has served a sentence pursuant to an alleg-
edly erroneous federal conviction may not obtain a writ vacating that
conviction unless there exists "a concrete threat that [the] erroneous con-
viction's lingering disabilities will cause serious harm to the petitioner." 4
In the 1970s, the Seventh Circuit upheld mail fraud convictions of the
four Craig petitioners for their roles in a scandal in the Illinois General
Assembly.5 The government prosecuted these convictions under the in-
tangible rights theory.6 All four petitioners had completed terms of ina-
1. 907 F.2d 653, amended by 919 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2013 (1991)
[hereinafter Craig III].
2. Id. at 657. The federal circuits are divided on whether petitioners for coram nobis relief
must allege that their prior convictions have resulted in "lingering civil disabilities," i.e., adverse
collateral consequences stemming from an erroneous conviction. What constitutes a legitimate disa-
bility further divides the circuits. Id. at 658-59. See infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
3. A writ of error coram nobis is a petition for post-conviction relief based on an "error as-
signed as a ground for reviewing, modifying, or vacating a judgement in the same court in which it
was rendered." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 543 (6th ed. 1990). See infra notes 12-29 and accom-
panying text.
4. 907 F.2d at 658.
5. Id. at 654. A ready-mix cement industry trade organization made bribes to secure passage
of a bill increasing the permissible weight of cement trucks on Illinois roads. See United States v.
Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 463-73 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) [hereinafter Craig 1].
6. Under this theory, courts analogized intangible interests, such as the right of citizens to
honest government, to property rights. During the 1970s, federal prosecutors frequently used the
intangible rights theory to prosecute individuals under the federal mail fraud statute for "devis[ing]
or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises" and using the mails to execute
or attempt to execute such a scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). See also M. Diane Duszak, Note,
Post-McNally Review of Invalid Convictions Through the Writ of Coram Nobis, 58 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 979, 984-85 (1990). In Craig 1, the indictment charging the petitioners with mail fraud
alleged, inter alia, that they had devised a scheme to "defraud the State of Illinois, its citizens, its
public officers, its public employees and the loyal, faithful and honest members of the Illinois Gen-
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prisonment when, in 1987, the Supreme Court invalidated the intangible-
rights theory in McNally v. United States.7 Robert Craig and Frank P.
North, Jr., two former members of the Illinois House of Representatives,
Pete V. Pappas, a former attorney involved in the scandal, and the estate
of former Illinois Senator Jack E. Walker sought relief from their mail
fraud convictions in light of the McNally decision.'
The petitioners applied for writs of error coram nobis in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that their convictions
were illegal and that the court should set them aside. 9 The court granted
the writ to North and to the Walker estate.10 The government and the
unsuccessful petitioners appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit,
which held that the law did not entitle any of the petitioners to post-
conviction relief because none had shown a "concrete threat that [his]
erroneous conviction's lingering disabilities will cause serious harm to
the petitioner."11
In federal criminal practice, the writ of error coram nobis is the only
eral Assembly of their right to have the State's legislative business conducted honestly and impar-
tially." Craig I, 573 F.2d at 462.
7. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). In McNally, the Court held that the federal mail fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1341, protected only property rights. 483 U.S. at 360. In 1988, Congress added 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which makes loss of intangible rights cognizable as mail
and wire fraud. Duszak, supra note 6, at 980 n.12. The McNally decision has prompted a spate of
coram nobis and habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts from individuals convicted under the
intangible rights theory. See Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Effect Upon Prior Convictions of Mc-
Nally v. United States Rule that Mail Fraud Statute (18 U. S.CS, § 1341) is Directed Solely at Depri-
vation of Property Rights, 97 A.L.R. FED. 797, 802 (1990).
8. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 654.
9. Craig v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 730, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 907 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 2013 (1991) [hereinafter Craig II].
10. Id. at 735. The district court agreed that McNally invalidated North's and Walker's mail
fraud convictions. Id. at 731. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. The court granted the
writs to North and the Walker estate because their allegations met the Seventh Circuit's require-
ments for a "lingering civil disability" as set out in established Seventh Circuit precedent. See infra
notes 47-58 and accompanying text. The prior conviction subjected North to the chance of incurring
a myriad of potential disabilities attaching to convicted felons under Illinois law. 703 F. Supp. at
734. These disabilities included ineligibility to obtain certain licenses and the possibility of an en-
hanced sentence in the event of a future conviction. Id. Walker's widow was unable to collect a
state pension as a result of her late husband's conviction. Id. at 734-35. However, the court did not
grant the writ to Pappas or Craig because they had violated a second federal statute that would have
precluded relief during their terms of imprisonment. Id. at 732. This holding reflects the require-
ment articulated by the district court and Seventh Circuit precedent, and inherent in the Seventh
Circuit's recent refinement ofcoram nobis prerequisites, that the defect in a petitioner's conviction be
"the type of defect that would have justified relief during the term of imprisonment." Id.
11. Craig 1, 907 F.2d at 658.
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recourse short of a presidential pardon available to persons who have
already served terms of imprisonment pursuant to erroneous convic-
tions.12 At early common law, parties used the writ only to bring errors
of fact before the court that had pronounced judgment.I3 In its modem
form, however, the writ may issue to correct errors of fact or law."g
During the 1940s, a number of developments in federal law made un-
clear the availability of any post-conviction remedy in the nature of a
writ of error coram nobis to those convicted of federal crimes. 5 In 1946,
the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which allows a district court to correct "an illegal sen-
tence at any time." 16 Rule 35, however, addresses only those sentences
illegally imposed pursuant to proper convictions. 7 In 1948, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which authorized motions to vacate, set aside,
or correct invalid convictions, and which effectively replaced the com-
mon-law writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners. 8 However, a sec-
tion 2255 motion requires that applicants be "in custody" at the time of
filing. 19 It is clear that prisoners unconditionally released after serving
12. Brendan W. Randall, Comment, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error Coram Nobis
and the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1063, 1070 n.43 (1990). See also LARRY W.
YACKLE, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 41-51 (1981 & Supp. 1991).
13. Duszak, supra note 6, at 981-82.
14. Id. See generally YACKLE, supra note 12, §§ 9-10, 37-39.
15. YACKLE, supra note 12, § 37; Randall, supra note 12, at 1067. Congress expressly abol-
ished the writ in federal civil practice in 1946. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) provides that
"[w]rits of coram nobis, . .. are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judg-
ment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." Id. In some
states, however, the common-law writ of error coram nobis continues to be available in both civil and
criminal cases. YACKLE, supra note 12, § 7.
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
17. Randall, supra note 12, at 1068 n.29. See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506
(1954).
18.
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988). Congress designed § 2255 to address problems in the administration of
habeas corpus petitions. Because federal law directs petitions for habeas corpus to courts in the
district of confinement, those federal districts near federal prisons experienced disproportionate pres-
sure from a rising number of petitions. Section 2255 dispersed petitions by providing for a motion
directed to the sentencing district. Randall, supra note 12, at 1073-74. The Supreme Court upheld
§ 2255's constitutionality in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
19. YACKLE, supra note 12, § 50. The Supreme Court has expanded the notion of "custody"
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federal sentences pursuant to invalid federal convictions do not meet sec-
tion 2255's jurisdictional custody requirement.2"
In United States v. Morgan,21 the Supreme Court held that the com-
mon-law writ of error coram nobis was available to fill this apparent gap
in federal post-conviction remedies. The petitioner in Morgan was serv-
ing a state prison term that the sentencing court had enhanced because of
a prior federal conviction.22 Alleging incompetent waiver of counsel in
the prior federal proceeding, he sought an order voiding the federal con-
viction, for which he had long since served the sentence.23 The district
court, treating the proceeding as a section 2255 motion, dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction because the applicant was no longer in cus-
tody under the federal sentence.24 The Supreme Court, finding that no
other remedy was available, held that the district court had jurisdiction
to treat the petitioner's "application" as a motion in the nature of the
common-law writ of error coram nobis.25 The Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that Congress had intended to restrict other post-con-
viction remedies when it enacted section 2255,26 and found the source of
its power to grant the writ in the All Writs Act.27 The Court did not
enumerate the specific circumstances under which a court should grant
or deny the writ, but stated that the writ should be an "extraordinary
beyond physical imprisonment so that parolees and persons free on bail, for example, are "in cus-
tody" for purposes of habeas corpus and § 2255 relief. Id. §§ 42-43, 50. See also Larry W. Yackle,
Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1001-03 (1985). Indeed, the "in custody" re-
quirement has become less a rigid jurisdictional restriction than a tool for identifying "those re-
straints on individual liberty that are severe enough" to justify collateral review. YACKLE, supra
note 12, § 42.
20. YACKLE, supra note 12, § 43.
21. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
22. Id. at 504.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 503-04. The court of appeals reversed, holding that § 2255 did not supersede reme-
dies in the nature of error coram nobis. Id. at 504.
25. Id. at 505.
26. Id. at 510. The Court found that § 2255's purpose was "'to meet practical difficulties' in
the administration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction." Id. at 511 (quoting United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952)). See supra note 18. The Court further added that "'[n]owhere
in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral
attack upon their convictions.'" Id. (quoting Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219).
27. Id. at 506. The All Writs Act, dating from the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that federal
courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). The dissent thought that the
writ of error coram nobis neither aided the district court's jurisdiction nor was agreeable to the
usages and principles of modem law. 346 U.S. at 515 (Minton, J., dissenting).
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remedy [available] only under circumstances compelling such action to
achieve justice" 28  or to correct errors "of the most fundamental
character."
29
Since Morgan, the circuit courts have developed a variety of conflict-
ing prerequisites for obtaining the writ.30 The writ is universally unavail-
able if the petitioner has not exhausted all statutory rights of review,31 or
if another remedy is available.3 2 The petitioner may not relitigate an is-
sue that she previously raised at trial or that she could have raised at that
time through ordinary diligence.3 Furthermore, courts will not hear an
issue that would not have affected the original trial's outcome.34 How-
ever, only some courts issue writs of error coram nobis if the convicting
court based its decision on an indictment that no longer states a crime,
while others refuse to issue the writ if the convicting court could have
found the defendant guilty of another crime not stated in the indict-
ment.35 Yet, the most significant difference among the circuits is their
treatment of what, if any, lingering consequences petitioners must show
as a result of an invalid federal conviction to justify vacating sentences
already served.36
The Ninth Circuit takes the least restrictive position. Petitioners need
not show any specific adverse consequences that they presently suffer or
28. 346 U.S. at 511.
29. Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)). The dissent argued
against "resurrecting the ancient writ of error coraxn nobis from the limbo to which it presumably
had been relegated by [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 60(b). ... and 28 U.S.C. Section 2255."
Id. at 513. The dissent further noted the lack of principled ways to limit the remedy. Id. at 519
(Minton, J., dissenting).
30. In United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit discussed
conflicts among the circuits and called for the Supreme Court to put these disputes to rest, noting
that the decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), has put pressure on a "formerly
quiescent corner of the law." 888 F.2d at 1149.
31. Duszak, supra note 6, at 990.
32. Id. at 979. See, e-g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987).
33. Duszak, supra note 6, at 979.
34. Id. at 979. But see Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604 n.14 (despite other circuits' statements to
the contrary, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has imposed such a requirement).
Finally, reasoning that post-conviction relief should not be more readily available to those out of
custody than to those still serving sentences, the Seventh Circuit grants writs of error coram nobis if
§ 2255 would have entitled the petitioner to relief had she applied for it while in custody. United
States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 204 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). See supra
note 18.
35. Duszak, supra note 6, at 987-89.
36. See infra note 46. See generally Duszak, supra note 6, at 986-87.
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are likely to suffer in the future.37 Indeed, the government carries the
burden of proving that "there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged convic-
tion."38 Adverse consequences from the conviction must give the peti-
tioner a stake in the litigation sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution, 39 but the
Ninth Circuit presumes that collateral consequences flow from any crim-
inal conviction.' The court bases this presumption on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Pollard v. United States4 1 and Sibron v. New York,42
which "acknowledged the obvious fact of life that most criminal convic-
tions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. '43 In view of
this "liberal presumption,"'  petitioners can almost automatically satisfy
the Ninth Circuit's civil disabilities requirement.45
37. United States v. McClelland, 732 F. Supp. 1534, 1537 (D. Nev. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 941 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1991).
38. United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Hirabayashi v. United
States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).
39. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604.
40. Id. at 606.
41. 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957) (presuming that "convictions may entail collateral legal disadvan-
tages in the future").
42. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (completion of sentence does not in itself render a criminal appeal
moot).
43. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 606 (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55). The Seventh Circuit explic-
itly criticizes the Hirabayashi court's reliance on these cases because "a direct appeal does not pres-
ent the same finality concerns that arise on a petition for a writ of error coram nobis." Craig III, 907
F.2d at 659 n.3. Furthermore, the issue in coram nobis cases is not whether completion ofa sentence
renders them moot, but rather, "what conditions justify the expenditure of judicial resources." Id.
The Supreme Court itself, however, relied on language from Morgan as support for its conclusions in
both Pollard and Sibron: "Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may
persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights may be affected." United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954); Pollard, 352 U.S. at 358; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 54-55.
44. United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989).
45. Id. (possible adverse effect on sentencing should a court convict petitioner of another crime
in the future, or allow the impeachment of petitioner as a witness sufficient to allow petitioner to seek
coram nobis relief); Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 607 (citing Miller v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 679
F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982)) (admonition in an attorney's permanent record for which he is
professionally accountable would constitute sufficient adverse consequences to satisfy Article III
requirements); Rewak v. United States, 512 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1975) (inability to obtain desired
employment sufficient to satisfy requirements). In Hirabayashi, the Ninth Circuit held that it could
grant a writ of error coram nobis to a petitioner seeking to remove the collateral consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction. 828 F.2d at 608. The court rejected the government's contention that
"ordinary misdemeanors have no 'collateral consequences' and therefore are not subject to post-
conviction attack absent some special legal disability." Id. at 605.
In 1942, a court had convicted the petitioner, a Japanese-American born in Seattle, for violating
curfew and exclusion orders imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast during the
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In contrast, most other circuits require petitioners to demonstrate that
they have more at stake than removing a blot from their records.46 The
Seventh Circuit has developed the most complex and restrictive analysis
Second World War. See generally Marc Hideo Iyeki, Note, The Japanese American Coram Nobis
Cases: Exposing the Myth of Disloyalty, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 199 (1984-85). As a
matter of conscience, Hirabayashi had refused to honor the curfew and to report for processing for
exclusion from the West Coast because he believed racial prejudice motivated these orders. 828 F.2d
at 593. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions under the rationale that emergency conditions
justified the curfew. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The Court upheld the exclu-
sion orders the following year in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). History has long
since established the Hirabayashi decision's injustice. See generally Iyeki, supra. However, Hiraba-
yashi's convictions stood until the Ninth Circuit granted his coram nobis petition in 1987 after a
researcher uncovered documents indicating the government had suppressed evidence in obtaining his
1942 conviction. 828 F.2d at 593. See also Peter Irons, Return of the "Yellow Peril," THE NATION,
Oct. 19, 1985, at 361. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), the
district court held that Hirabayashi's conviction for violating the exclusion order violated due pro-
cess and ordered it vacated. The court further concluded that it would not vacate the curfew convic-
tion because the conviction rested on a different legal foundation. Id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed
and ordered the district court to vacate both convictions. 828 F.2d at 594.
The Ninth Circuit refused to adopt a per se rule that misdemeanor convictions carry no collateral
consequences. Id. at 605. In its decision, the Ninth Circuit referred only to consequences that were
personal to Mr. Hirabayashi. He had brought suit, however, to remove the stigma of disloyalty
suffered by the entire Japanese-American population in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943), and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In an article written before the 1987 decision of
Hirabayashi's coram nobis appeal, Marc Hideo Iyeki describes the coram nobis lawsuits of Hiraba-
yashi, Yasui, and Korematsu as "analogous to a class action waged on behalf of all former intern-
ees." Iyeki, supra, at 214-20. He argues that courts should characterize the social stigma of wartime
disloyalty based on race that the entire Japanese-American population suffered as a cognizable legal
disability giving rise to a case or controversy sufficient to avoid dismissal on grounds of mootness.
Id. The Ninth Circuit ultimately resolved the mootness issue by refusing to adopt the per se rule
that the government advanced. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 605.
As a test for granting coram nobis relief, Hirabayashi articulated four requirements: "(1) a more
usual remedy [must] not [be] available; (2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier;
(3) adverse consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy re-
quirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character." Id. at 604.
46. See, eg., United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1084 (1989). Early cases in all circuits tended to characterize as moot petitions for writs of
error coram nobis in which the petitioner did not indicate that she currently was suffering civil
disabilities. For a comprehensive list of citations, see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Availabil-
ity, Under 28 USCS § 1651, of Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Vacate Federal Conviction Where
Sentence Has Been Served, 38 A.L.R. FED. 617, 637 (1978 & Supp. 1991).
The Fourth Circuit agrees with the Ninth that petitioners need demonstrate no disability other
than "fac[ing] the remainder of their lives branded as criminals." United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d
1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989). The Fourth Circuit's position on the
criteria necessary for coram nobis relief may be even less restrictive than that of the Ninth Circuit.
In Mandel, the dissent protested that the successful petitioner had not satisfied the fourth element of
the Hirabayashi test. See supra note 45. A court had convicted Mandel, then Governor of Mary-
land, of mail fraud and racketeering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1961 and 1962. The dissent argued
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of the civil disabilities requirement for coram nobis relief. The seminal
decisions in that circuit, United States v. Keane 4 7 and United States v.
Bush,48 both written by Judge Easterbrook, addressed the coram nobis
petitions of former Chicago public officials convicted of mail fraud.49
that his trial had been "replete with evidence of bribery and manipulation," and thus the error was
not fundamental. 862 F.2d at 1079 (Hall, J., dissenting).
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits require a showing of collateral consequences, but have not given the
matter extensive consideration in published opinions. For Fifth Circuit cases, see United States v.
Bruno, 903 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1990) (remanding cases to the district court for a determination of
collateral consequences without discussing what would be sufficient); United States v. Marcello, 876
F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989) (a petitioner "must be absolved of the consequences flowing from his
branding as a federal felon"); United States v. Hay, 702 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1983) (remanding cases to
the district court for a determination of collateral consequences without discussing what would be
sufficient); Puente v. United States, 676 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982) (youth offender's inability to obtain
certain types of employment constituted sufficient adverse collateral consequences); Cline v. United
States, 453 F.2d 873, 874 (5th Cir. 1972) (a petitioner "must be able to show some present or pro-
spective adverse effect from an unconstitutional conviction"). For Eighth Circuit cases, see Stewart
v. United States, 446 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1971) (requiring showing of "outstanding adverse legal conse-
quences"); McFadden v. United States, 439 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1971) (same).
In United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit "hinted" that its
is a restrictive view of the collateral disabilities requirement. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 659. A 1963
Third Circuit case held that the mere moral stigma of a guilty plea in a Mann Act prosecution would
not support a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, but that denial of the right to vote would.
United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
There are no recent Second Circuit civil disabilities cases, but older cases in that circuit, consistent
with older cases in other circuits, generally treat civil disabilities as a prerequisite for Article III
standing. See United States v. National Plastikwear Fashions, Inc., 368 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966)
(mere moral stigma of a conviction insufficient to meet redressabiity requirement); Goitia v. United
States, 335 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no present controversy because offender could not derive
any benefits from vacatur of conviction); United States v. Gernie, 228 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(court empowered to hear merits of petition because results of conviction might well persist); United
States v. Oddo, 129 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (motion in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis presents no case or controversy because nullification of conviction would have no effect). See
also Kyle v. United States, 288 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1961) (denial of right to vote is a substantial civil
disability warranting treatment of a petition to vacate sentence brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as a
petition for writ of error coram nobis).
Neither the First nor the Sixth Circuit has decided the issue. In a post-Craig III decision, the
First Circuit explicitly stated, "[w]e need not decide whether any such [collateral consequences]
requirement applies in this circuit." United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 39 n.1 (1st Cir. 1991).
No Sixth Circuit coram nobis decisions exist in which collateral consequences were an issue. In
Flippins v. United States, 747 F.2d 1089, 1091 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1056 (1987),
the court explained that "[the writ of error coramn nobis is available to a convicted criminal at any
time following the entry of a judgment against him or her," and the basis for granting the writ is
"demonstration of(1) an error of fact, (2) unknown at the time of trial, (3) of a fundamentally unjust
character which probably would have altered the outcome of the challenged proceeding if it had
been known." Id.
47. 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
48. 888 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989).
49. Thomas E. Keane had been chairman of the Chicago City Council's Finance Committee.
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Both petitioners sought coram nobis relief based on McNally's invalida-
tion of the intangible rights doctrine,50 but were unsuccessful because
they did not advance sufficient civil disabilities.51 In Keane, the court
held that neither the reputational injury the petitioner had suffered nor
the $27,000 fine he had paid were adequate civil disabilities. 2
Bush's petition alleged that his conviction prevented him from ob-
taining high visibility public relations jobs.53 The court denied relief be-
cause the petitioner's inability to obtain desired employment was merely
a kind of reputational injury that granting a writ of error coram nobis
could not redress.54 The civil disability requirement, Judge Easterbrook
explained, arises primarily out of the legal system's interest in the finality
of judgments.55 Collateral review pursuant to section 2255 is available to
federal prisoners only because they are in custody.56 However, "[t]he
reason to bend the usual rules of finality is missing when liberty is not at
stake."'57 Only a "custody-substitute," the court held, justifies revisiting
a conviction for which the penalties have long since expired.5"
In United States v. Craig,59 the Seventh Circuit refined "what it means
for a coram nobis petitioner to show that he still suffers from a civil disa-
bility."'6 After reviewing Bush and Keane,6" the court held that a bona
He and two friends formed a partnership to acquire title to land sold at property-tax-delinquency
auctions. Keane then used his position to obtain special Finance Committee treatment of the parcels
and to sell them at inflated prices to public agencies. Keane, 852 F.2d at 200-01. Earl Bush, Press
Secretary to Mayor Richard J. Daley from 1955 to 1973, had not disclosed that he was a principal in
the firm that held the display advertising concession at O'Hare Airport. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1145.
50. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
51. The court denied Keane's petition for "three independently sufficient reasons." Keane, 852
F.2d at 206. First, the indictment stated an offense. Second, Keane had fully aired his objection to
the intangible rights theory at trial and on appeal. Third, he was not under a civil disability as a
result of his conviction. Id.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1148.
54. Id. at 1150.
55. Id. at 1149.
56. Id. at 1146.
57. Keane, 852 F.2d at 203.
58. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1146.
59. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 653.
60. Id. at 658. The court also considered the jurisdictional issue of whether to apply the time
limits for appeals in criminal or civil cases. The court applied the latter and concluded it had juris-
diction under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Id. at 655-57.
61. The court noted that the petitioners in Keane and Bush had been suffering adverse effects of
erroneous convictions that did not rise to the level of civil disabilities in view of the more important
"systematic interests in finality." Id. at 658. Neither the loss of a fine nor inability to obtain a
desirable job, in short, presented "a concrete threat ... [of] serious harm to the petitioner." Id.
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fide civil disability must satisfy three elements: the disability must cause
present harm, must arise out of the erroneous conviction, and the harm
must be more than incidental.62 The court explained that the facts in
Morgan present the best example of a situation in which coram nobis
relief is appropriate.63 A petitioner serving an enhanced sentence in an-
other jurisdiction because of an allegedly erroneous federal conviction
asserts a disability that meets all three of the Seventh Circuit's require-
ments. 64 He suffers a present harm by languishing in jail.65 The alleg-
edly erroneous conviction directly caused the harm.66 Finally, enduring
a longer prison sentence is a "more than incidental" harm. 67
Turning to the claims of the four Craig petitioners, the court held that
none was entitled to relief. 68 The court disposed of the Walker estate's
claim on preliminary jurisdictional grounds, holding that it was indistin-
guishable from Seventh Circuit precedent 69 establishing that a decedent's
estate lacks standing to bring a coram nobis petition.70 The court did not
reconsider whether the petitioners' convictions were invalid under Mc-
Nally.71 Instead, the court denied relief to all three of the remaining
petitioners because none had asserted sufficient civil disabilities.72
The court concluded that Pappas, the former attorney seeking rein-
statement to the bar, advanced a sufficiently serious harm in the loss of
an occupational license.73 However, the court regarded the possibility of
harm as merely speculative.74 The court was not convinced Pappas sin-
cerely intended to seek reinstatement, nor did it think his prospects for
62. Id. In footnote two, following the second element, the court commented that "this second
requirement is also reflected in our rule that if an indictment states one valid offense, then no coram
nobis relief is available, 'for a single felony conviction supports any civil disabilities.'" Id. at 658 n.2
(quoting Keane, 852 F.2d at 205).
63. Id. at 658.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court stated that other situations may present legitimate grounds for coram nobis
relief, but gave no other examples. Id. The court also acknowledged that its position on civil disa-
bilities is the most restrictive of all the federal circuits. Id. at 658-59.
68. Id. at 659.
69. United States v. Kerner, 895 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1990).
70. Craig 11I, 907 F.2d at 657.
71. Id. at 660. The court also avoided the argument advanced on appeal that Pappas' and
Craig's Travel Act convictions could not stand independent of their mail fraud convictions. Id.
72. Id. at 659.
73. Id.
74. Id. See also Keane, 852 F.2d at 204 (loss of high-visibility public relations job insufficient
disability).
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reinstatement were good because dishonest conduct alone could lead to
disbarment.75
Craig and North were unsuccessful because they asserted past
harms. 76 They argued that the court's removal of their convictions
would entitle them to reinstatement in a legislators' pension plan and to
receive pension benefits." However, the court regarded their removal
from the pension plan as "a sunk cost, much like a criminal fine."178 In
addition, Craig and North argued that their convictions had erroneously
deprived them of their seats in the state legislature, an injury the court
deemed "a classic example of a past harm that a writ of error coram
nobis could not or should not remedy." '79
All three petitioners combed Illinois statutes, some long since re-
pealed, for disabilities convicted felons suffer.8 0 This tactic worked for
North in the district court," l but failed on appeal because the Seventh
Circuit considered these disabilities speculative at best.82 As to the possi-
bility that the petitioners might be subject to sentence enhancement for
future crimes, the court refused to recognize what amounted to an inten-
tion to commit future crimes.8 3 Finding that no petitioner suffered suffi-
cient lingering civil disabilities, the court affirmed the district court's
denial of the writ of error coram nobis to Craig and Pappas, reversed the
district court's judgment granting the writ to North, and remanded the
petition of the Walker estate with instructions to vacate.8
In United States v. Craig, the Seventh Circuit correctly concerned it-
self with restricting the writ of error coram nobis to the deserving. As
the Supreme Court held in Morgan, the writ of error coram nobis is an
extraordinary remedy that should be available only in extraordinary situ-
ations.8 5 However, the imposition of an independent civil disabilities re-
75. 907 F.2d at 659.
76. Id. at 660.
77. Id.
78. Id. See Keane, 852 F.2d at 203 (reiterating the "sunk cost" argument).
79. 907 F.2d at 660.
80. Id.
81. Craig II, 703 F. Supp. at 734.
82. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 660.
83. Id.
84. Id. Because it had failed to order a remand of the Walker estate's appeal to the district
court for dismissal, the court issued an amended order for that purpose along with its denial of the
petitioners' motion for rehearing. United States v. Craig, 919 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1990).
85. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954). See supra notes 21-29 and accompany-
ing text.
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quirement is not an evenhanded way to limit its availability. First, the
Seventh Circuit's civil disabilities requirement is contrary to sound public
policy to the extent it favors repeat offenders over those who never offend
again.16 Second, while the court correctly disapproved of collateral at-
tacks on judgments, it should more closely adhere to the Supreme
Court's Morgan opinion and make the writ available in the presence of
"fundamental error" and "circumstances compelling such action to
achieve justice.""7
The Seventh Circuit's civil disabilities test fails most petitioners be-
cause it takes into account only two interests: the judicial system's inter-
est in finality of judgment and the individual's interest in removing the
collateral consequences of an erroneous conviction. 8 Almost never will
collateral consequences personal to the individual outweigh "systemic in-
terests in finality."8 9 When fairness requires, broader concerns should
weigh into the balance, such as the gravity of the government's error in
obtaining the original conviction and society's interest in ensuring that
means exist to correct injustice.90
Finally, the Seventh Circuit deviated from Morgan without compelling
justification insofar as Morgan requires neither a "custody substitute"
nor a present disability. 91 In holding that section 2255 does not preclude
coram nobis relief, the Morgan Court provided not merely for a narrow
exception to section 2255's "in custody" requirement, but for a federal
86. When two petitioners seek to void equally erroneous convictions, this requirement would
force the court to grant the writ to one who had committed a subsequent crime and deny it to one
who had not. As the dissent in Morgan recognized, providing an avenue of collateral attack to
individuals no longer in federal custody gave rise to problems of limitation: "The relief being devised
here is either wide open to every ex-convict as long as he lives or else it is limited to those who have
returned to crime and want the record expunged to lessen a subsequent sentence. Either alternative
seems unwarranted." Morgan, 346 U.S. at 519 (Minton, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in Craig the
Seventh Circuit chose the latter alternative.
87. Id. at 511-12.
88. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 658.
89. Id.
90. The Seventh Circuit has criticized the Ninth Circuit's Hirabayashi decision for holding that
"anyone may obtain coram nobis just to bask in the satisfaction of having his position vindicated."
Keane, 852 F.2d at 204. Much more was at stake in Hirabayashi, however. The government had
not merely erred in the original proceeding, but had actively misbehaved by suppressing critical
evidence. See supra note 49. Moreover, by vacating the conviction of one wrongly convicted Japa-
nese-American, the Hirabayashi decision served a societal need by showing that some means exist to
vindicate the truth. While cases such as Hirabayashi are exceedingly rare, they demonstrate that a
central failing of the Seventh Circuit's civil disabilities test is its subordination of every other consid-
eration to the principle of finality.
91. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 658.
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collateral remedy without a custody requirement.92 As the "in custody"
requirement itself is no longer a rigid jurisdictional hurdle in section
2255 actions,9" imposing a rigid collateral consequences requirement par-
allel to section 2255's "in custody" requirement makes little sense.
Moreover, to the extent that the Seventh Circuit's civil disabilities test
justifies denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis if the peti-
tioner has not asserted a sufficient injury or stake in the litigation, it rep-
resents a heightened standing requirement that has come unmoored from
the Supreme Court's standing analysis.
Unquestionably, the issue remains how to limit the availability of the
writ of error coram nobis only to those situations in which a fundamental
error in an earlier federal proceeding has produced "circumstances com-
pelling such action to achieve justice."94 In United States v. Craig, the
Seventh Circuit too narrowly interpreted this language by refining a test
that favors, in virtually every case, "systemic interests in finality"95 over
the individual's often weighty interests in removing the collateral conse-
quences of an erroneous conviction.
Jennifer Mee
92. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511.
93. YACKLE, supra note 12, § 42. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. If the Craig
decision relies on the theory advanced in Keane and Bush that collateral relief is not justified with-
out a "custody-substitute," supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text, the civil disabilities test is
incongruent both with Morgan and with the "in custody" requirement. The Fourth Circuit made
this argument in 1966 in Mathis v. United States, 369 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1966). The court explained:
While in Morgan the defendant's status as a second offender constituted a "present imposi-
tion" flowing from the prior conviction, the Court did not expressly or impliedly lay down
such a requirement for the granting of the writ. Indeed, to the extent that the "present
imposition doctrine" is analogous to the "in custody" proviso of section 2255, the Court
implicitly rejected it as a prerequisite to the grant of coram nobis by holding that Congress
did not intend to restrict other post-conviction remedies by enacting section 2255.
Id. at 47. The Fourth Circuit added that "[e]ven in section 2255 cases the 'in custody' requirement
has been consciously relaxed to reduce its impact upon prisoners having a just claim to relief." Id. at
48. Finally, the court concluded that, "[iln light of these developments it would be anomalous at
this date to read into coram nobis a stringent requirement that the petitioner show a 'present adverse
effect.'" Id.
94. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511.
95. Craig III, 907 F.2d at 658.
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